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 Physiological Linguistics, and Some Implications 
Regarding Disciplinary Autonomy and Unifi cation 
 SAMUEL D.  EPSTEIN 
 Abstract :  Chomsky ’ s current Biolinguistic (Minimalist) methodology is shown to 
comport with what might be called  ‘ established ’ aspects of biological method, thereby 
raising, in the biolinguistic domain, issues concerning biological autonomy from the 
physical sciences. At least current irreducibility of biology, including biolinguistics, 
stems in at least some cases from the very nature of what I will claim is physiological, 
or inter-organ/inter-component, macro-levels of explanation which play a new and 
central explanatory role in Chomsky ’ s inter-componential (interface-based) explanation 
of certain (anatomical) properties of the syntactic component of Universal Grammar. 
Under this new mode of explanation, certain  physiological functions of cognitive mental 
organs are hypothesized, in an attempt to explain aspects of their internal anatomy. 
Thus, the internal anatomy of the syntactic component exhibits features that enable it 
to effectively interface with (i.e. function in a coordinated fashion with) other  ‘ adjacent ’ 
organs, such as the Conceptual-Intensional (C-I) ( ‘ meaning ’ ) system and the Sensory- 
Motor (SM) ( ‘ sound ’ ) system. These two interface systems take as their inputs the 
assembled outputs of the syntactic component and, as a result of the very syntactic 
structure imposed by the syntax (as opposed to countless imaginable alternatives) are 
then able to assign their (linearized) sound and (compositional) meaning interpretations. 
If this is an accurate characterization, Chomsky ’ s long-standing postulation of mental 
organs, and I will argue, the advancement of new hypotheses concerning physiological 
inter-organ functions, has attained in current biolinguistic Minimalist method a 
signifi cant unifi cation with foundational aspects of physiological explanation in other 
areas of biology. 
 1. Introduction 
 This paper has two main goals. One is simply to suggest that there are some 
striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, similarities 
between  Chomsky, 2005 ( ‘ Three factors in language design ’ ) and central aspects 
of  Mayr, 2004 ( What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy 
of a Scientifi c Discipline ). The potential importance of these similarities is at least 
 Physiological Linguistics, and Disciplinary Autonomy and Unifi cation  45
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
two-fold; fi rst, it illustrates to practicing linguists, especially to a linguist such as 
myself — who is by no means a biologist — how directly Chomsky ’ s current 
Biolinguistic Minimalist methodology comports with what might be called 
 ‘ established ’ aspects of biological method — at least as conceived by Mayr. Second, 
I will suggest that some of the possible challenges, or skepticism, facing contemporary 
biolinguistic method may mimic similar, and in some cases precedented, challenges 
or skepticism which faced the emerging fi eld of biology, which as Mayr ’ s title 
suggests, struggled (and arguably still struggles) to maintain autonomy from other 
scientifi c disciplines. 
 The  ‘ autonomy ’ question directly relates to issues concerning scientifi c 
theory reduction, in particular the possibility of reducing biology to physics. I 
suggest that at least  current irreducibility in biology, including biolinguistics, 
stems in at least some cases from the very nature of what I will claim is 
physiological, or inter-organ/inter-component,  levels of explanation . These play 
a central role in Chomsky ’ s inter-componential (interface-based) explanation of 
properties of the syntactic component of Universal Grammar. Specifi cally at 
issue is Chomsky ’ s recent attempt to explain certain hitherto stipulated 
constraints on syntactic mechanisms in terms of the syntactic component having 
to assemble (or generate) outputs that satisfy distinct interpretive components 
of sound and meaning, the so-called Output Conditions. Thus the properties of 
one component of a system (the syntax) are in part to be explained by its 
outputs having to meet the demands imposed by other components, external to 
it, but with which it interfaces. The components that take in the products of 
the syntax are the two interpretive components: one assigns a phonological 
interpretation, the other a semantic interpretation to structured representations 
assembled by the syntax. Can the formal properties of the syntactic subsystem 
of Universal Grammar be (in part) explained by this syntactic subsystem having 
to meet the dual (and disparate) demands of phonological and semantic 
interpretability? Under this mode of explanation-seeking inquiry, certain 
 physiological functions of mental organs are being hypothesized, along with equally 
empirical hypotheses regarding the (anatomical) structure of these organs. Thus, 
I take seriously the hypothesis that the language faculty is  ‘ organ-ized ’ , i.e. an 
organ of the body (Chomsky, (as early as) 1975 and (as recently as) 2005), along 
with other cognitive systems. With  Gallistel (2005) , I assume that the problem 
of explaining human language acquisition, the growth of linguistic knowledge 
in the individual: 
 … is so formidable that there is no hope of surmounting it without a task-
specifi c learning organ … with a structure tailored to the demands of this 
particular domain ( Gallistel, 2005 , p. 2). 
 (I also agree with Gallistel that the vague notion of  ‘ General Purpose 
Learning ’ is scientifi cally wholly inadequate and unable to account for any other 
specialized cognitive feats performed by other organisms, e.g. the dead-reckoning 
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 1  See, among many other works by  Gallistel, 2006 . For an excellent and engaging non-technical 
overview of the myriad cognitive-mathematical abilities of various organisms (from dogs to 
lobsters to ants) see  Devlin, 2005 . 
[path-integration] algorithm used in insect navigation.) 1 As concerns the human 
language organ, I also follow Gallistel in adopting the following perspective: 
 Whether this organ is a highly localized part of the brain or arises from a 
language specifi c interconnection of diverse data-processing modules in the 
brain is irrelevant to whether it constitutes a distinct organ or not. Some 
organs are localized (for example the kidney) while others ramify everywhere 
(for example the circulatory system) ( Gallistel, 2005 , p. 2). 
 As concerns such organs, and their physiological function, Gallistel adopts the 
following (I believe partly physiological, partly anatomical) characterization of an 
organ: 
 The essential feature of an organ is that it has a function distinct from the 
function of other organs and a structure suited to that function, a structure that 
makes it possible for it to do its job ( Gallistel, 2005 , p. 2). 
 If the arguments I provide below are on track, Chomsky ’ s long-standing 
postulation of mental organs, and I will argue, the advancement of new 
hypotheses concerning physiological inter-organ functions, has effected in 
current biolinguistic Minimalist method a signifi cant unifi cation with 
foundational aspects of anatomical, coupled with physiological, modes of inquiry 
and explanation in other areas of biology. (For an excellent and accessible 
discussion of Chomsky ’ s notion of a language organ, but not inter-organ 
function, my focus here, see  Anderson and Lightfoot, 2002 .) Ignorance of the 
history of (I think highly questionable) opposition to such forms of inquiry and 
explanation in (non-cognitive) biological domains increases the odds of 
unwittingly repeating this same history in the biolinguistic arena, and perhaps 
this repetition has already begun. For some recent discussion, see e.g.  Jenkins, 
2000 and Boeckx, forthcoming. With hope, this paper clarifi es to at least some 
degree, the nature, progress and promise of this new mode of physiological, 
inter-organic linguistic inquiry and explanation as pioneered in Chomsky ’ s 
recent unifying Minimalist research method, within which, I argue, not only 
the internal anatomy of individual organs is explored (e.g. the anatomy/structure 
of universal mechanisms of human syntactic subsystems), but inter-organic 
physiological function is also postulated. The anatomy or structure of the 
syntactic component is such that this organ can effectively interface with (i.e. 
function in a coordinated fashion with) other organs, such as the Conceptual-
Intensional (C-I) ( ‘ meaning ’ ) system and the Sensory- Motor (SM) ( ‘ sound ’ ) 
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system, the interface systems that take as their inputs the outputs of the syntactic 
component and impose upon these syntactically structured representations sound 
and meaning interpretations. 
 2. Chomsky ’ s Three Factors and Mayr ’ s Principle of Dual (actually, Triple) 
Causation 
 Arguably, the central point made in  Chomsky, 2005 is to revisit an important 
insight already broached, albeit briefl y, in at least  Chomsky (1988 , pp. 167, 189) 
and  Chomsky (1965 , p. 59) regarding the roles of biology and of physics in 
determining properties of the human language faculty. Chomsky advances the 
following partly methodological hypothesis, which comports with the Minimalist 
(more generally, scientifi c) method of trying to explain (not merely describe) 
aspects of the natural world — in this case, individual human knowledge of language, 
a property of individual organisms, hence a bio-physical entity. 
 Assuming that the faculty of language has the general properties of other 
biological systems, we should, therefore, be seeking three factors that enter into 
the growth of language in the individual: 
   1.  Genetic endowment  … which determines the general course of the 
development of the language faculty.  … 
 2.  Experience, which leads to variation, within a fairly narrow range, as in 
the case of other subsystems of the human capacity and the organism 
generally. 
 3.  Principles not specifi c to the faculty of language. 
 The third factor falls into several subtypes: (a) principles of data analysis that 
might be used in language acquisition and other domains; (b) principles of 
structural architecture and developmental constraints that enter into canalization, 
organic form, and action over a wide range, including principles of effi cient 
computation, which would be expected to be of particular signifi cance for 
computational systems such as language. It is the second of these subcategories 
that should be of particular signifi cance in determining the nature of attainable 
languages ( Chomsky, 2005 , p. 6). 
 I believe that Chomsky ’ s three-factor perspective and  Mayr ’ s 2004 principle of 
dual (in fact, triple) causation in biology are very closely related. Importantly, 
Mayr identifi es this multiple causation as  a defi ning characteristic of biology that is 
directly responsible for its disciplinary autonomy, specifi cally, its irreducibility to 
physics. Mayr writes: 
 … all biological processes differ in one respect fundamentally from all 
processes in the inanimate world; they are subject to  dual causation . 
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In contrast to purely physical processes, these biological ones are controlled 
not only by natural laws but also by genetic programs. This duality fully 
provides a clear demarcation between inanimate and living processes ( Mayr, 
2004 , p. 30). 
 Thus, Mayr crucially assumes that what makes biology unique (and, as will be 
discussed below, irreducible to physics in Mayr ’ s view), is dual causation, i.e. the 
role of both (1a) and (1b). 
 (1)  a.  Genetic Programs 
  b.  ‘ Natural Laws ’ 
 The kind of genetic program operative in the human language faculty (as it is 
conceived by Chomsky) is an  ‘ open program ’ (not a  ‘ closed program ’ ) in Mayr ’ s 
sense of this term: 
 … open programs [ … ] are constituted in such a way that additional information 
can be incorporated during a lifetime  … In the famous case of the following 
reaction in the young gosling, the open program provides for the  ‘ following 
reaction ’ , but the particular object ( ‘ the parent ’ ) to be followed is added by 
experience (by  ‘ imprinting ’ ) ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 54). 
 Thus, for both Chomsky and Mayr, there are in fact three factors that must be 
distinguished, and identifi ed correctly, in determining the nature of the various 
properties of organisms. 
 (2)  The Three Factors 
   a.  Genetics, in particular open programs (for Chomsky, fi xed Principles 
and open Parameters of Universal Grammar); 
   b.  The limited effect of the environment/experience such that 
 ‘ additional information ’ (Mayr) can be incorporated (= parameter 
setting, or re-setting, under exposure to, and analysis of, environmental 
linguistic input to the developing child, e.g. exposure to Swahili vs. 
German input for Chomsky); 
   c.  Natural laws (Mayr), factors independent of the genetically determined 
aspects of the open program (= Chomsky ’ s third factor, e.g.  ‘ principles 
of structural architecture and developmental constraints  … that enter 
into organic form  … ’ ). 
 It is merely a terminological idiosyncrasy that Mayr collapses (2a) and (2b) into the 
seemingly single notion  ‘ open program ’ ; i.e. the program is largely fi xed by 
genetics (a human embryo cannot develop into a horse), but aspects are suffi ciently 
plastic to be infl uenced by environmental input, e.g. whether a baby will develop 
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knowledge of Japanese or of German. Open programs and natural law constitute 
Mayr ’ s  ‘ dual causation ’ . 2 
 In sum, I think that Chomsky ’ s current Minimalist biolinguistics embraces the 
same foundational, if not defi ning, methodology expressed by Mayr ’ s philosophy 
of (what he regards as) the autonomous fi eld of biology. If that ’ s an accurate 
characterization, Chomsky has effected in his current framework of Three Factor 
Biolinguistic Minimalism a signifi cant unifi cation with foundational aspects of 
biological inquiry which presume that organic structure and growth is determined 
by three factors. The remainder of this paper explores some aspects of this three 
factor approach to the nature and growth of the human language organ, while 
also discussing what I believe to be Chomsky ’ s path-breaking exploration of the 
physiological function (as opposed to  ‘ mere ’ internal anatomy) of the language 
organ within the larger system of organs within which it operates. 3 
 2.1 Teleonomic versus Teleomatic Processes 
 Given his principle of dual causation, Mayr dedicates a signifi cant amount of 
discussion to the corresponding distinction between what he calls  ‘ teleomatic ’ versus 
 ‘ teleonomic ’ processes. This duality is offered as an alternative to  ‘ cosmic teleology ’ , 
the belief that  ‘ there is a trend in the world toward progress or perfection ’ held by 
 ‘ the most determined opponents of natural selection  … .( Mayr, 2004 , p. 59–60). 
 For Mayr, teleomatic processes: 
 … come to an end when the potential is used up (as in the cooling of a heated 
piece of iron) or when the process is stopped by encountering an external 
impediment (as when a falling object hits the ground). The law of gravity and 
the second law of thermodynamics are among the natural laws that most 
frequently govern teleomatic processes ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 50). 
 As concerns this distinction between teleomatic and teleonomic processes, Mayr 
writes: 
 the very general terminal situations effected by natural laws are something 
entirely different from the highly specifi c goals coded in programs. 
 2  Newell (1990 , p. 42) seems to propose a similar three-factor framework in investigating 
human cognition more generally: 
Theories of human cognition are ultimately theories of physical biological systems. Our ability 
to describe human cognition in one way rather than another rests ultimately on the physical 
and biological nature of human beings. Furthermore the fact that human beings are grounded 
in the world implies additional constraints that must be taken into account in constructing our 
theories. 
 3  One possible, but not clear, dissimilarity between Chomsky and Mayr in this regard may lie in 
the former using the term  ‘ factor ’ and the latter  ‘ cause(ation) ’ . I will not analyze this issue here. 
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The existence of programs, of course, is in no way in confl ict with natural 
laws. All the physiochemical processes that take place during the translation 
and execution of a program strictly obey natural laws. 
 By contrast with teleomatic processes, teleonomic processes are goal-directed and 
the goal directness of such processes is due (not to cosmic teleology, but) to the 
operation of an evolved program: 
 The existence of teleonomic processes regulated by evolved programs is the 
reason for the dual causation in biology, due to the natural laws (as in the 
physical sciences) and due to genetic programs (not found in the physical 
sciences) … .. It is important  … to emphasize … that the goal of a teleonomic 
activity does not lie in the future but is coded in the program. Not enough is 
known about the genetic molecular basis of such programs to permit us to say 
much more than that they are innate or partly innate. The existence of the 
program is inferred from its manifestations in the behavior of the activities of 
the bearer of the program ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 53-4). 
 The similarity to Chomsky ’ s three-factor approach should be clear. Importantly, 
the as yet undiscovered genetic-molecular bases of such programs is, according 
to Mayr, pervasive in the biological sciences, yet many scholars nonetheless 
incorrectly claim that it refl ects an  ‘ immaturity ’ of biological science (see  Mayr, 
2004 , p. 79).  ‘ Ignorance ’ of the genetic molecular basis of such programs is 
therefore not an idiosyncratic  ‘ shortcoming ’ peculiar to current biolinguistics, 
nor an  ‘ unreal abstractness ’ in linguistics or cognitive psychology, more 
generally. (For a recent discussion of persisting deep-seated confusions regarding 
 ‘ reality versus abstractness ’ in linguistics, and in science more generally, see 
 Epstein and Hornstein, 2005 ). Generalizing even further, as Chomsky (p.c.) 
points out, the same situation characterizes scientifi c development in other 
areas, e.g. many signifi cant achievements of astronomy having been attained 
long before the molecular basis of the planets was known or even imagined. 
 In the next section, I discuss  ‘ levels of explanation ’ and suggest that a failure to 
recognize the different levels of analysis at which illumination may occur may 
underlie such charges of insuffi ciency of all but genetic-molecular, or alternatively 
physical, explanation. Regardless, it is important that  ‘ charges ’ of current 
irreducibility not be leveled against biolinguistics alone, if in fact these alleged 
criticisms are applicable to aspects of contemporary biological science in general, 
the autonomy (i.e. irreducibility) of which, recall, is  Mayr ’ s (2004) central dual 
causation thesis. The same goes for the apparently biological (not linguistically 
unique) method, pioneered in the 1950s by Chomsky in the linguistic domain, by 
which (to repeat): 
 the existence of the innate or partly innate program, about which we have 
insuffi cient genetic-molecular knowledge, is inferred from its manifestations 
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in the behavior of the activities of the bearer of the program ( Mayr, 2004 , 
pp. 53-4). 
 3. Reduction, Levels of Analysis and Explanation 
 Mayr ’ s stance regarding reduction of the biological sciences to the physical sciences 
may also resemble Chomsky ’ s position regarding the corresponding question of 
biolinguistic reducibility to physical science. It seems to me that, in Mayr ’ s view, 
to obey or conform to natural laws (as Mayr assumes all biological processes do) is 
not to be illuminated or explained by them. Mayr illustrates: 
 … to neglect the role of information and instruction inevitably results in a 
most misleading description of a program. Could one  explain [my emphasis] a 
computer strictly in terms of natural laws, carefully avoiding any reference to 
information and instruction? 
 Similarly,  Newell (1990 , p. 47) writes, 
 A computer system can be described in many ways. It can be described as a 
system of electronic devices, or as an electrical circuit, or as a logic circuit, or 
as a register transfer system, or as a programming system. There are other 
ways as well, ways that are not related to its primary function, such as an item 
of cost in a budget, a contributor to fl oor loading, or an emblem of being 
high-tech. 
 In a similar vein,  Lange (2004 , p. 108) (opposing  Rosenberg ’ s 2001 reductionist 
position; see also  Mayr, 2004 , p. 80) discusses the autonomy of functional biological 
explanation as follows: 
 Take the explanation that the vulture has no feathers on its head and neck 
because the vulture feeds by sticking its head and neck deep inside the 
bodies of carrion, so any feathers there would become matted and dirty. 
This explanation is independent of the details of the laws of physics. Putnam 
uses a similar example to defend the irreducibility of macro-explanations; 
why a cubical peg, 15/16 ’ on a side, cannot fi t into a round hole 1 ’ in 
diameter. 
 Putnam writes: 
 The explanation is that the board is rigid, the peg is rigid, and as a matter of 
geometric fact, the round hole is smaller than the peg … That is a correct 
explanation whether the peg consists of molecules, or continuous rigid 
substance, or whatever (1975, p. 296). 
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 Lange continues (2004, p. 109): 
 A peg (or vulture) made of continuous rigid substance would violate laws of 
physics. But the same functional explanation would apply to it. That distinctive 
range of invariance refl ects the irreducibility of this kind of explanation to 
anything that could be supplied, even in principle, by the laws of physics  … 
 Here, the notion  ‘ level of analysis ’ seems crucial. Putnam and Lange ’ s points are that 
explanation of the unfi tting peg/featherless vulture neck lies at a macro/functional 
level, not at the molecular, or for that matter, any physical level, in the opinions of 
Putnam and Lange. Similarly,  Cummins (2002 , p. 4) characterizes a certain 
description of a mechanical gate-opening Rube Goldberg device as follows: 
 … the components are identifi ed functionally and their interactions are 
described in a way that necessarily abstracts away from the medium-dependent 
details. 
 In what I hope is accurately characterizable as a (fi tting) analog to Putnam ’ s 
unfi tting peg argument, Mayr writes: 
 Nothing is as characteristic of biological processes as interactions at all levels 
 …  the interaction of the components [my emphasis] must be considered as much 
as the properties of the isolated components ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 34-5). 
 In precisely the same vein, the renowned evolutionary biologist and geneticist 
 Dobzhansky (1969 , p. 170) writes that: 
 A biologist is faced with several hierarchically superimposed levels of integration 
of structures and functions. 
 And: 
 Organic phenomena are, indeed, patterns of chemical and physical components. 
There is no vital force, no entelechy, no psyche. The point is, however, that 
understanding the patterns is just as essential and exciting as understanding the 
components. A mosaic picture consists of stones of various colors, but it is a 
pattern, not a pile of stones. A living body is not a mixture of chemicals stirred 
together; it is an integrated system which arose gradually during the two 
billion years of organic evolution ( Dobzhansky, 1969 , p. 171). 
 The view is shared by his colleague, the microbiologist  Dubos (1965) : 
 In the most common and probably the most important phenomena of life, the 
constituent parts are so interdependent that they lose their character, their 
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meaning, and indeed their very existence, when dissected from the functioning 
whole (as cited by  Dobzhansky, 1969 , p. 166). 
 Chomsky (p.c.), I think, shares this view by distinguishing what he calls metaphysical 
reductionism and epistemological anti-reductionism. Chomsky writes: 
 Metaphysical reductionism holds that we can explain genetic and computer 
programs, etc., in  ‘ physical ’ terms — which simply amounts to saying that there 
is a naturalistic explanation, since the notion  ‘ physical ’ is open-ended. 
Epistemological anti-reductionism holds that to capture what is actually 
happening in the world, many differing scales are appropriate: for determining 
the earth ’ s orbit around the sun we don ’ t have to pay attention to whether 
Jones put a dish on the table, or whether the table is round or square. In fact, 
we can treat earth as a mass point. Same with any kind of problem. There ’ s no 
confl ict between metaphysical reductionism and epistemological anti-
reductionism. 
 This same issue concerning reduction in the linguistic domain is addressed by 
 Smith (2002 , p. 68): 
 … it doesn ’ t follow that that physiological generalizations can be stated … in 
the vocabulary of particle physics any more than it follows that … linguistic 
generalizations can be stated in the vocabulary of neuroanatomy. 
 Poeppel and Embick ’ s (2004) discussion of unifi cation between linguistics and 
neuroscience is also relevant here. They identify two problems, characterized in 
(3) and (4) below. 
 (3)  The Granularity Mismatch Problem: 
   ‘ Linguistic and neuroscientifi c studies of language operate with objects 
of different granularity. In particular, linguistic computation involves a 
number of fi ner-grained distinctions and explicit computational opera-
tions. Neuroscientifi c approaches to language operate in terms of broader 
conceptual distinctions .’ 
 (4)  The Ontological Incommensurability Problem: 
   ‘ The fundamental elements of linguistic theory [e.g. syllable, clause] 
cannot be reduced or matched up with the fundamental biological units 
identifi ed by neuroscience [e.g. neuron, cortical column] .’ 
 As Poeppel and Embick (p. 6) note, it is unreasonable to require that all linguistic 
entities must have visible refl exes in current imaging (or lesion or psycholinguistic) 
data; with (p. 13) the basic assumption being that we study aspects of brain function 
by relying on, and thus being guided by,  ‘ a system whose functional architecture 
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is well understood ’ . The solution to these problems rests in their view on the 
notion we ’ ve been discussing, namely  ‘ levels of abstraction ’ or scale. 
 We suggest a straightforward solution … namely spelling out the ontologies 
and processes in computational terms that are  at the appropriate level of abstraction 
[my emphasis] (i.e. can be performed by specifi c neuronal populations) such 
that explicit interdisciplinary linking hypotheses can be formulated ( Poeppel 
and Embick, 2004 , p. 5). 4 
 As  Gallistel (2006 , p. 70) elegantly notes,  ‘ If behavior is the last court of appeal, 
then there are mechanisms in the nervous system not yet dreamed of in the 
philosophy of neuroscientists ’ . And, moreover, this kind of cross-disciplinary 
incommensurability is by no means unprecedented. As Gallistel further notes (2006 
and p.c.), the classical geneticists’  ‘ abstract ’ concept of a gene was biochemically 
unintelligible, hence seemed senseless to biochemists of the time. Yet the abstract 
concept in fact guided the very search that led to the molecular discoveries, and, 
importantly, these discoveries did  not wholly replace or subsume the classical 
genetic level of analysis, which remains. 
 This same perspective regarding levels of analysis and their role in explanation, 
regardless of the domain of inquiry, is generally expressed by  Whitehead (1938) 
when he suggests that: 
 … understanding always involves the notion of composition. This notion can 
enter in one of two ways. If the thing understood be composite, the 
understanding of it can be in reference to its factors, and to their ways of 
interweaving so as to form that total thing. This mode of comprehension 
makes evident why the thing is what it is. The second mode of understanding 
is to treat the thing as a unity, whether or not it is capable of analysis, and to 
obtain evidence as to its capacity for affecting its environment. The fi rst mode 
may be called the internal understanding, and the second mode is the external 
understanding … . The two modes are reciprocal; either presupposes the other. 
The fi rst mode conceives the thing as an outcome, the second mode conceives 
it as a causal factor  … ( Whitehead, 1938 , p. 45–6). 
 The fact that each of Whitehead ’ s two modes of understanding presupposes the 
other is not a contradiction or an indication of circularity, but an unavoidable 
 4  On the important difference between the reduction of one science wholly to another versus 
unifi cation-via-disciplinary revision, see Chomsky (e.g. 2002, pp. 54-6). For incisive discussion 
of the disunity of the sciences, including specifi c discussion of psychology and its relation to 
neurology and neurology ’ s relation to physics, see  Fodor, 1974 . As Fodor notes,  ‘ Reducibility 
to physics is taken to be a  constraint upon the acceptability of theories in the special sciences, 
with the curious consequence that the more the special sciences succeed, the more they ought 
to disappear ’ . 
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feature of trying to rationally determine the properties of interacting systems. The 
same perspective is expressed by Chomsky when he writes of the relation between 
the syntax and the sound-meaning interfaces whose assembly requirements are by 
hypothesis met by effi cient (arguably, third factor) application of the operations 
applied within the syntax. 
 We can regard an explanation of properties of language as  principled insofar as 
it can be reduced to properties of the interface systems and general 
considerations of computational effi ciency and the like. Needless to say, 
these  ‘ external ’ conditions are only partially understood, we have to learn 
about the conditions that set the problem in the course of trying to solve it. 
The research task is interactive  … not an unfamiliar feature of rational inquiry 
( Chomsky 2005 , p. 10). 
 4. Chomsky ’ s Physio-Syntactic Analysis:  ‘ External ’ Explanation at the 
Component-Interaction Level 
 The explanatory power of the macro level of analysis and its irreducibility is 
emphasized by Mayr: 
 What counts in the study of a complex system is its organization. Descending 
to a lower level of analysis often decreases the explanatory power of the 
preceding analysis  … ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 72). 
 And so, 
 Reduction, by failing to consider the interaction of components, fails to fulfi ll 
what it promises  … ( Mayr, 2004 , p. 80) . 
 Echoing Putnam ’ s cubical peg/round hole argument, Mayr notes that the explanatory 
value of functional explanation extends to inanimate objects as well, noting that the 
internal (in Whitehead ’ s sense) composition of a hammer ’ s handle, e.g. wood versus 
steel, is irrelevant to an explanation of its function. That is, it is the (inter-componential) 
combination/organization of the handle as joined with hammerhead that permits the 
explanation of its function.  ‘ A further downward analysis adds nothing ’ . 5 
 Importantly,  Chomsky (2005 , and earlier) addresses this very issue of levels of 
explanation, in his discussion of  Gallistel ’ s (1997) compelling evidence that learning 
is based on specialized mechanisms, or  ‘ organs within the brain ’ , writing: 
 The modular view of learning of course does not entail that the component 
elements of the module are unique to it; at some level, everyone assumes that 
 5  As Neil Smith (p.c.) notes, this is reminiscent of  Fodor ’ s 1974 attack on reductionism 
regarding the likely irreducibility of Gresham ’ s Law to physical principles. 
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they are not — the cellular level for example — and the question of the level of 
organization at which unique properties emerge remains a basic one  … 
( Chomsky, 2005 , p. 5). 
 Chomsky ’ s point is clear. Levels of analysis and macro-level emergence play a vital 
role in (biological), hence biolinguistic, explanation. 
 I propose that the levels of analysis of the human language faculty, although not 
labeled as such, include, within the recent Minimalist Program, (5) and (6) below. 
 (5)  Within-organ anatomical analysis, e.g. analysis of the structure of the 
syntactic component (as a recursive assembler) displaying the property of 
discrete infi nity. 
 (6)  Inter-organ (physiological function) analysis, whereby the or a function 
of the syntax is to produce outputs (assemblages) that satisfy the bare 
output conditions imposed by  ‘ adjacent organs ’ that interface with the 
narrow syntax, namely the interface systems C-I and SM, which demand 
that syntactic assemblages be  ‘ semantically ’ and  ‘ phonologically ’ 
interpretable. 
 As a somewhat simplifi ed, partly anachronistic, but concrete, illustration of this 
mode of explanation — whereby the syntax is party explained by its appeal to 
(inter-organ) physiological function of having to meet the demands imposed by 
the sound and meaning interpretive components external to it — consider the case 
of standard (syntactic) theory phrase structure rules such as (7). 
 (7)  Noun Phrase  ® determiner noun. 
 Such a rule characterizes (your) knowledge that a noun phrase (in English) can 
consist of any determiner immediately followed by any noun. Such rules were 
initially stipulated, hence unexplained, aspects of human linguistic cognition. The 
question  ‘ Why do all syntactic systems of (by hypothesis) all human languages 
contain phrase structure rules? ’ was unanswered (if ever asked). 
 A defi ning formal characteristic of such rules is that each one expresses two 
kinds of information, namely containment relations and precedence relations. For 
example, (7) above expresses your knowledge that 
 (8)  a.  A noun phrase may consist of, or contain, two elements, namely a 
determiner and a noun. Equivalently, a set of the form {noun, 
determiner} is known by you to be one kind of noun phrase. 
   b. The determiner (e.g.  the ) precedes the noun (e.g.  dog ). 
 Containment information, as in (8a), is arguably universal; by hypothesis, it is not 
an idiosyncrasy of English that noun phrases can contain a determiner and a noun 
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(and we expect no human language to, e.g., have noun phrases containing just a 
verb and a preposition). Precedence information, as in (8b), is by hypothesis 
language particular, and so we are unsurprised to fi nd word-order variation among 
human languages. 
 ‘ Why do human syntactic systems include such phrase structure rules, 
specifying containment and precedence? ’ An answer, appealing to physiological 
function, runs as follows:  ‘ It is no accident or mystery that syntactic phrase 
structure rules specify precisely containment and precedence relations .’ The 
semantics  requires set representation, i.e. containment relations, so that it  ‘ knows ’ 
what is to be semantically composed with what. Thus, the syntax provides the 
semantics with unambiguous unique assemblages. Thus, e.g. the set representation/
assemblage in (9), 
 (9)  [old men] and [women],
 receives a compositional semantic interpretation different from the semantic 
interpretation assigned to the syntactic representation in (10), 
 (10)  old [men and women]. 
 However, the phonology or articulatory system cannot successfully implement or 
execute these semantically necessary containment/set representations, since, 
unlike semantic composition, articulation involves phono-temporal ordering (you 
can ’ t say  the dog  ‘ all-at-once ’ ). Thus, it is no accident that the syntax also supplies 
ordering, or precedence, relations. In sum, the syntax specifi es containment since 
this type of information is required for compositional semantic interpretation, and 
the syntax also specifi es order since articulatory implementation requires it. Thus, 
the fact that phrase structure rules (the very backbone of the standard theory of 
syntax) specify such information needs no longer by considered axiomatic, but 
rather becomes physiologically explicable, in terms of the syntax producing 
representations that satisfy the demands imposed by adjacent organs, namely 
the interpretive components of sound and meaning, which take syntactic outputs 
as their inputs. As we ’ ll discuss momentarily, the bio- minimalist perspective 
is completed under the hypothesis that phrase structure rules provide  precisely 
such information — no less and no other superfl uous information — and thus 
constitute not only a  ‘ solution ’ to the demands imposed by the interfaces, but an 
optimal one. 6 
 6  For more contemporary and formal discussion of syntactic containment and precedence as an 
 ‘ optimal solution ’ within a current derivation-based Minimalist system incorporating Bare 
Phrase Structure ( Chomsky, 1994 ) and the Linear Correspondence Axiom ( Kayne, 1994 ), see 
 Epstein  et al , 1998 , Section 6.4. 
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 5. Chomsky ’ s Physiological-Syntax, Component Interaction and Hempel ’ s 
Logic of Functional Explanation 
 5.1. Introduction 
 Before proceeding it is important to avoid a possible terminological confusion. 
Throughout this paper, I use the term  ‘ physiological ’ or  ‘ physiological function ’ 
in the following sense: characteristic of the normal inter-componential 
functioning of an organism. Crucially,  ‘ function ’ in this context is NOT to be 
construed in the sense of  ‘ functional ’ (e.g. strong adaptationist  ‘ communication-
based ’ ) attempts to explain the presence or etiology of the design features of the 
language faculty. Rather my claim here is that Chomsky ’ s inter-componential 
mode of explanation is standard physiology, addressing the circumscribed 
question  ‘ How does it function within a larger system of which it is a part? ’ 
distinct from the evolutionary questions  ‘ How did  language arise? ’ and  ‘ Does it 
confer a selectional advantage upon its bearers? ’ , the latter being the standard, 
functionalist question  ‘ What is language for? ’ . With Fitch Hauser and  Chomsky, 
2005 , I regard such questions about  ‘ language ’ as an unanalyzed whole, 
unproductive; and, as FHC note, even if circumscribed it may have the same 
unproductive quality as a question such as  ‘ What is the brain for? ’ By contrast, 
standard physiology hypothesizes that one component of a biological system can 
be understood as functioning so as to produce outputs whose properties meet 
(or can meet, or to a certain degree meet) requirements imposed by a neighboring 
component that takes in these very outputs as its inputs. Following  Cummins 
(1975 , as cited by  Grene and Depew, 2004 , p. 316): 
 To ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it which is singled 
out by its role in an analysis of some capacity of a containing system. 
 As concerns the historical role and productivity of such physiological analysis, and 
its current promise, Mayr relates the following: 
 When Harvey was asked what had induced him to think of the circulation 
of the blood, he answered  ‘ I wondered why there were valves in the veins ’ 
( Krafft, 1982 ). Evidently they permit only a one-directional fl ow of the 
blood and this, almost automatically, led to an assumption of circulation. 
One physiological discovery after another resulted from asking  ‘ Why? ’ 
questions concerning organs with unknown function  … and the heuristic 
value of this methodology has by no means been exhausted ( Mayr, 2004 , 
p. 59). 
 Similarly,  Gallistel (2005 , p. 1) writes: 
 Harvey (1628) revolutionized physiological thinking when he showed that 
the heart circulates the blood and that its structure suits it to perform this 
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function  … .  Chomsky (1975) reconceptualized learning in his Refl ections on 
Language. His reconceptualization is as radical in its implications for psychology 
and neuroscience as Harvey ’ s work was for physiology. 
 One of my central tenets in this paper is that Gallistel ’ s likening of  Chomsky 
(1975) to  Harvey (1628) can and should be applied to the formal content of 
current Minimalist theory. Specifi cally, I think that Chomsky ’ s new appeal to 
inter-organic linguistic explanation, in particular the central idea of the syntax 
formally operating in such a way as to satisfy the demands of the C-I (meaning) 
and SM (sound) interfaces (thereby seeking to explain previously stipulated 
syntactic mechanisms and constraints), is indeed physiological. (As concerns the 
importance of asking  ‘ why ’ questions, e.g.  ‘ Why does the syntax operate as it 
does? ’ and the unfortunate disparagement of such scientifi cally standard 
explanation-seeking in linguistics, see e.g. the introductions to  Epstein and Seely 
(2002, 2006) . Again, the comparison with biological inquiry is, I think, important.) 
Chomsky ’ s question  ‘ Why does the syntax operate as it does? ’ is qualitatively 
similar to Harvey ’ s. Chomsky ’ s answer in terms of inter-component function 
seems comparably physiological. Recall that, arguably, the leading idea of the 
Minimalist Program is the following: 
 If language is to be usable at all, its design must satisfy an interface condition 
IC; the information in the expressions generated by L, must be accessible to 
other systems including the SM (sensorimotor) and CI systems … Insofar as 
properties of L can be accounted for in terms of IC and general properties of 
computational effi ciency … they have a principled explanation ( Chomsky, 
2001 , p. 2). 
 Similarly, 
 … to what extent is the human faculty of language FL an optimal solution to 
minimal design specifi cations, conditions that language must satisfy to be 
useable at all? We may think of these specifi cations as legibility conditions for 
each language L (a state of FL), the expressions generated by L must be legible 
to systems that access these objects at the interface between FL and external 
systems — external to FL, internal to the person. 
  The strongest Minimalist thesis SMT would hold that language is an optimal 
solution to such conditions ( Chomsky, 2001 , p. 1). 
 And, similarly, 
 The components of expressions — their features, in standard terminology —
 must be interpretable by the systems that access them; the representations at 
the interface with sensorimotor and thought systems consist of interpretable 
features ( Chomsky  et al. , 2002 , p. 88). 
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 This is a, or perhaps the, central premise of Chomsky ’ s inter-organ, physio-
syntactic explanation, as examined in  Epstein (2005) . It appears centrally again in 
Chomsky ’ s most recent work (2005, pp. 9-10): 
 We can … try to sharpen the question of what constitutes a principled 
explanation for properties of language, and turn to one of the most fundamental 
questions of the biology of language; to what extent does language approximate 
an optimal solution to conditions that it must satisfy to be usable at all, given 
extralinguistic structural architecture? … .the expressions generated by a 
language must satisfy two interface conditions; those imposed by the 
sensorimotor system SM and by the conceptual-intentional system C-I  … . 
 I believe that this form of argument, or this empirical method closely corresponds 
to what  Hempel (1959) discusses in his foundational paper,  ‘ The logic of functional 
analysis ’ , to which I turn in the next section. 
 5.2 Hempel ’ s Functional Analysis 
 Again, it is important to note that  ‘ functional ’ as used by Hempel has a very 
different meaning from  ‘ functional ’ as it is used in the context of  ‘ functional 
linguistics ’ , the latter addressing questions such as  ‘ What is language for? ’ (Again, 
following Fitch, Hauser and  Chomsky, 2005 , I believe that such questions are so 
vague as to be unproductive, for at least two reasons. First, the notion  ‘ language ’ 
is presumed to be suffi ciently clear (and indecomposable analytically) to 
advantageously pose the question presupposing the notion; but, arguably, it is not. 
Second, even if it were clear, or more clear, as might be e.g. the notion  ‘ the brain ’ , 
the question  ‘ What is the brain for? ’ is arguably insuffi ciently clear to be productively 
addressed, just as Fitch, Hauser and  Chomsky, 2005 note.) Hempel, rather, 
concerns himself with the following: 
 The kind of phenomenon that a functional  … analysis is invoked to explain is 
typically some recurrent activity or some behavior pattern in an individual or 
a group,  such as a physiological mechanism [my emphasis]  … functional analysis 
seeks to understand [some phenomenon or property]  … . By determining the 
role it plays in keeping the given system in proper working order ( Hempel, 
1959 , pp. 304-5). 
 As an example, Hempel considers the statement in (11). 
 (11)  The heartbeat in vertebrates has the function of circulating blood. 
 Notice here the inter-componential nature of the statement: that is, the heartbeat 
constitutes a mechanism — a property of organ/component #1 (it beats/contracts) — 
that permits an interface with organ/component #2 (e.g. the vascular/arterial 
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systems). By analogy, consider the following passage from  Chomsky, 2005 [with 
my inserts bracketed and italicized]: 
 We can … try to sharpen the question of what constitutes a principled 
explanation for properties of language [ the cardiac system ], and turn to one of 
the most fundamental questions of the biology of language [ cardiological inquiry ]; 
to what extent does language [ the heart ] approximate an optimal solution to 
conditions that it must satisfy to be usable at all, given extra-linguistic [ extra-
cardiological ] structural architecture?  … the expressions generated by a language 
[ cardiac output ] must satisfy two interface conditions: those imposed by the 
sensori-motor system SM and by the conceptual-intentional system C-I [ e.g. 
those imposed by the arterial and vascular systems with which the heart directly interfaces ] 
 … ( Chomsky, 2005 , pp. 9-10). 
 Notice also that (11) is stated at a certain (higher) level of analysis at which we are 
unconcerned with e.g. the cellular composition of the heart (Whitehead ’ s internal 
understanding); but we are regarding  ‘ the heart ’ as a component of a system 
(Whitehead ’ s external understanding), each component of which is, by hypothesis, 
characterized at  ‘ the same level ’ of description. As Chomsky repeatedly notes,  ‘ the 
human heart ’ (as e.g. depicted on a physician ’ s wall poster) is an abstraction, lacking 
myriad properties of any existing  ‘ real ’ heart, e.g. the differing decibel level 
produced by each beat. 
 As concerns this issue, Hempel raises the question,  ‘ What is the difference 
between a function and an effect? ’ He points out that they are importantly different, 
as illustrated by the statements in (12) and (13). 
 (12)  The heartbeat has the effect of producing heart sounds. 
 (13)  The heartbeat has the function of producing heart sounds. 
 Hempel argues that the functional analyst would refuse to assert (13), 
 … on the grounds that heart sounds are an effect of the heartbeat which is of 
no importance to the functioning of the organism; whereas the circulation of 
the blood effects the transportation of nutriment to, and the removal of waste 
from, various parts of the organism — a process that is indispensable if the 
organism is to remain in proper working order, and indeed if it is to stay 
alive. 
 At least two issues now require clarifi cation regarding this passage. First, as concerns 
the  ‘ life or death ’ issue, within the linguistic domain, we are, by hypothesis, NOT 
claiming that the narrow syntax is a necessity for my current survival, akin to my 
survival depending upon now having a heart. That is, (were it possible) removal 
(without any replacement) of my cardiac system would cause immediate death, 
whereas, in the relevant sense, I think removal of my narrow syntax and replacement 
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of it with a modifi ed narrow syntax that failed to meet any requirements of the 
interfaces, would NOT, by hypothesis, result in my death. This is, of course, an 
 ‘ abstract argument ’ , as I assume, with Chomsky, that my syntactic system cannot 
be surgically removed anymore than my (rule governed, see e.g.  Hoffman, 1998 ) 
visual system, or cardiac system as abstractly conceived, can be surgically removed. 
(Here, I leave aside the contentious debate regarding natural selection of the 
language faculty; see  Jenkins, 2000 for extremely important discussion including 
the systematic misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Chomsky ’ s position 
regarding this issue.) 7 
 Second, as Hempel realizes, his central functional distinction between heart as 
blood-circulator versus heart as sound-maker appeals to, and requires clarifi cation 
of,  ‘ proper working order ’ ,  ‘ functioning ’ , and the like, of the organism. Again, the 
heartbeat arguably plays a role in  ‘ proper working order ’ , while heartsounds do not. 
The (un)clarity of these terms leads Hempel to a certain, central reservation regarding 
the explanatory depth of functional explanation, to which we will return below. 
 If I am correct that my narrow syntax is NOT required, whereas my heartbeat 
is, for my continued individual survival, how can I possibly maintain my conjecture 
that Chomsky ’ s analysis — and its concomitant attempt to explain properties of the 
narrow syntax — is indeed functional in Hempel ’ s sense? Especially, since, as 
concerns individual survival, the cases seem radically different. 
 What I would like to suggest is that this relates intimately to what is meant by 
Hempel by terms such as  ‘ proper working order ’ . But how is proper working order to 
be quantifi ed? I think the answer crucially concerns, at least in part, inter-componential 
compatibility within a given system — are the outputs of component #1 useable by 
component #2? The criterion  ‘ Is X necessary for the survival of the individual 
organism? ’ is largely irrelevant to quantifying the overall inter-component compatibility 
of the/a system. A human will die in an oxygen-free environment, but the deceased 
(organism), in the sense at hand, still displays considerable inter-componential 
physiological design-compatibility — it just happens to be dead! Similarly, inanimate 
objects can display degrees of inter-componential compatibility. The key to relating 
the two modes of explanation (Chomsky ’ s and Hempel ’ s) is, I believe, the following: 
 (14)  At the inter-componential level of explanation of a given system, 
function is to be gauged in terms of the output of one subcomponent 
 7  It is important to note that here I am making an empirical claim regarding (a) physiological 
function, regarded as one property, of the current syntax. How the anatomy and physiology 
of this system evolved is a separate question from what the system currently consists of. In 
fact, the question  ‘ How did IT evolve? ’ is dependent on some characterization of the current 
structure and function of that which evolved. For extensive discussion of the very serious 
problems and confusions inherent in attempting to explain certain current organic structures 
and functions exclusively in terms of natural selection (contra Darwin, who identifi ed natural 
selection as one, not the only, factor in evolution), see e.g.  Jenkins, 2000; Fitch, Hauser and 
Chomsky, 2005; Cummins, 2002; Atran, 2005; and Gould, 1985 (the latter regarding incipient 
stages and exaptation). 
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consisting of products that are — to one degree or another — useable by 
the  ‘ neighboring component ’ which takes these outputs as its inputs. 
 Heartsounds are not a function of the heartbeat, precisely because there is no 
auditory-processing system directly linked to the heart. If there were an auditory 
processing component directly linked to the heart, then by hypothesis, one 
function of the heart would be to feed this system with auditorily analyzable inputs, 
regardless of whether this  overall systemic organization has or lacks Rube 
Goldbergian properties. Thus, physiological or  ‘ functional ’ analysis of the inter-
component compatibility within a system is, by defi nition, orthogonal to the 
question of how the overall system might be used, or operate, as itself a component 
in a super-system containing it. The standard non-generative functional 
(communicative) question  ‘ What is language for, or used for? ’ does not arise in this 
domain of inquiry, any more than the questions  ‘ What is the brain for? ’ or  ‘ What 
will Bill use his brain for? ’ arise in the cognitive and/or neurosciences. 
 This inter-component compatibility lies at the core of Hempel ’ s characterization 
of the nature of functional analysis. 
 (15)  Basic Pattern of a Functional Analysis: 
  The object of the analysis is some object  i (e.g., the beating of the 
heart) occurring in a system  s (e.g., the body of a living vertebrate). 
The analysis aims to show that  s is in a state, or internal condition  ci , 
and in an environment representing certain external conditions  ce , such 
that under conditions  ci and  ce (to be referred to jointly as  c ), the trait  i 
has effects which satisfy some  ‘ need ’ or  ‘ functional requirement ’ of  s, 
i.e., a condition  n which is necessary for the system ’ s remaining in 
adequate or effective, or proper, working order. 
 This, I believe, characterizes the general form of inquiry and analysis that Chomsky 
proposes, and is, I believe, a natural extension from Chomsky ’ s postulation of 
mental organs. That is, with a preliminary hypothesis in hand as to the internal 
nature of the syntax organ, one can proceed to ask (in the manner of Whitehead ’ s 
 ‘ external understanding ’ ) its role, or function, as a component within a larger 
system of interacting components, essentially the fi eld of physiology — as contrasted 
with anatomy — in (nonmentalist) biology. Recall: 
 We can … try to sharpen the question of what constitutes a principled 
explanation for properties of language, and turn to one of the most fundamental 
questions of the biology of language; to what extent does language approximate 
an optimal solution to conditions that it must satisfy to be usable at all, given 
extralinguistic structural architecture?  … . the expressions generated by a 
language must satisfy two interface conditions: those imposed by the 
sensorimotor system SM and by the conceptual-intentional system C-I  … 
( Chomsky, 2005 , pp. 9-10). 
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 Thus, following Aristotle (as Chomsky notes),  ‘ language ’ has  ‘ sound ’ and also 
 ‘ meaning ’ , and the syntax relates them, thereby generating pairs of sound-meaning 
representations. But for Chomsky, the syntax, SM, and C-I are each organs of the 
body, and so, I suggest, a (heretofore absent) physiological level of inter-organic 
function is postulated as an explanatorily central aspect of Chomsky ’ s contemporary 
bio-linguistic Minimalist theory. 
 5.3 Challenges to Hempel? 
 The purpose of this brief section is simply to discuss previously-voiced potential 
reservations concerning the explanatory nature of Hempelian functional analysis, 
and to suggest that it is perhaps the case that opposition to Chomsky ’ s analysis 
(physio-mentalist analysis, if I am on track) may well repeat a similar history of 
reservation towards, or opposition to, such modes of analysis. 
 To begin with, although Hempel claimed that functional analysis (again, meant 
here in the sense just discussed) has a defi nitely empirical core, he claimed that it 
constitutes neither a deductive nor inductive mode of inquiry/explanation. The 
obstacle to functional deductive explanation, in Hempel ’ s view, is the existence 
of functional equivalents. Consider the following example: given an entire 
specifi cation of human anatomy and physiology,  minus the heart , we can  not deduce 
(or induce) the existence of the human heart, but only a (non-unit) set of 
functionally equivalent blood-circulators (including, for example, a Jarvik artifi cial 
heart) serving the same function. Presumably there exist an infi nite number of 
 ‘ solutions ’ to the goal-directed challenge of pumping blood. In this regard, it is 
important to note that Hempel, although cautious, himself regards such analysis 
as  ‘ illuminating suggestive and fruitful in a number of contexts ’ and  ‘ at least 
ideally, as a program of inquiry ’ ( Hempel, 1959 , p. 330). This, of course, is 
strikingly reminiscent of Chomsky ’ s careful (but sometimes misunderstood) use of 
the term (Minimalist)  ‘ Program ’ , and his explicitly discussed avoidance of the 
term  ‘ Minimalist Theory ’ . 
 Interestingly,  Nagel (1961) argued against Hempel ’ s position regarding functional 
explanation, and claimed instead that functional analysis  can , in principle, be made 
to fi t the deductive pattern. Salmon summarizes: 
 Nagel is not moved by other possible devices, such as Jarvik artifi cial hearts, 
inasmuch as they do not circulate blood in  normal human beings. He is equally 
unmoved by fi ctitious possibilities that are not realized in nature ( Salmon, 
1989 , p. 115). 
 Arguably, the crucial notion,  ‘ realizable in nature ’ , directly relates to the nature of 
biophysical explanation (Mayr ’ s dual causation/Chomsky ’ s Three Factors) with 
which we began. My suspicion is that further inquiry into just such realizability in 
nature promises to elevate Chomsky ’ s pioneering explanation-seeking Minimalist 
Program of inquiry to an even more deeply explanatory theory of human linguistic 
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knowledge, which is precisely Chomsky ’ s intent: inter-organ, physiological, and 
third factor explanation. As Chomsky notes, regardless of one ’ s specifi c theoretical 
linguistic orientation, the well-established biological questions seem unavoidable 
in the linguistic domain, if as seems undeniable, we, like other (earthly) organisms, 
are part of the biophysical universe. 
 To sum up this section, there exists a precedented debate regarding the 
explanatory properties of such analyses, and varying views regarding the effi cacy of 
such analysis as applied in various domains. If I am on track that Chomsky ’ s 
Minimalist Program, and the central concept of the syntax satisfying the demands 
imposed by the interfaces, is indeed a form of inter-organ physiological mentalism 
(functional in Hempel ’ s sense), then cognizance of the previous debates, confusions 
and indeterminacies regarding the nature of such analyses might inform the current 
debate concerning the productivity of such programs of inquiry which seek to 
determine the  ‘ external ’ properties of a sub-system. If I am on track here, one 
essential feature of Minimalist physiology involves determining the  ‘ external 
properties ’ of a sub-system, and then explaining some of the properties of a module 
by appeal to systems external to it. This is a necessary component of all understanding 
in Whitehead ’ s view, and a component that is explanatorily irreducible in the 
minds of many. 
 Department of Linguistics
 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
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